Often in media we are immediately cued to the moral qualities of a character before any actions or dialogue have been given to portray such judgments. This can be explained through the use of Disposition Theory (Zillmann, 2000; Zillmann, 2006) and its theoretical extensions (see Raney, 2004). Judgments of the moral extremity of moral upholding and violation are likely dependent upon the attributes of ourselves that we view as positive or negative (Monin & Jordan, 2009) and also the traits we perceive as important within others (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Wojciszke, Bazinska, & Jaworski, 1998; Cottrell, Neuberg, & Li, 2007; Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). But do judgments of a moral action rely on cognitive dispositions? If we are predisposed to be considering positive moral character traits, would a moral violation cause perception of that action as being more severe than if they were predisposed to be considering negative moral character traits? The current thesis reports the results of a study designed to answer this question. Using a sentence unscrambling task to initially prime subjects with a positive, negative, or control moral character trait dispositions, subjects are then presented with moral violations or upholding of care-, fairness-, loyalty-, and authority-relevant actions, and tasked with rating the level of (dis)approbation that each action should carry. Results indicate very little, if any, priming effect of the sentence unscrambling task on the moral judgments. Future research would do well to follow-up on this research however, as this particular study had a relatively low N and could result in significance in future endeavors. Keywords: Disposition Theory, Moral Foundations Theory, Priming, Person-Perception.