Can a small state persuade a great power ally that something is a threat? If so, under what circumstances will threat persuasion efforts be successful?

I hypothesize that when a great power understands its regional interests to be broad and loosely defined, threat persuasion becomes much more likely. However, when a great power believes its regional interests to be narrow or specific, a small ally will have a much more difficult time persuading its great power ally that something is a threat, and what to do about it.

In order for threat persuasion to be successful, a small state must persuade its great power ally not only that something is a threat, but also what to do about it. The two states do not need to agree on everything, but the great power must change or undertake some policy in a way that it likely would not have done otherwise. I refer to this process by which a small state demonstrates how something threatens the interests of a great power ally as "threat linking."

Smaller states may feel threatened by something that a great power is only vaguely aware of. At the same time, modern great powers have interests and allies in every region of the world. When great powers understand these regional interests broadly, it is relatively easy for a small state to link its security concerns to the perceived interests of the great power. This asymmetry of interests accounts for why a small power, with relatively limited resources and influence, can significantly alter the polices of a great power ally.

I test this theory by applying it to four historical case studies. I examine formal and informal alliances, as well as narrow and broad great power interests. I find that there is strong empirical support for this dissertation's hypothesis in three out of the four cases, and weaker evidence in the remaining case.