This study focuses on the problem of properly aligning executive incentives with that of shareholder interests. While it is widely believed that executive interests should be aligned with shareholders, there is not agreement on how best to do this, or that it leads to mutual benefits. Rather, there are many instances in which one party benefits and the other does not. This calls into question whether incentives may lead to worse financial outcomes for the company and shareholders in some situations. This study specifically looks at the relationship between firm performance/board power and executive compensation. The purpose of this study is to identify the performance components that have a direct relationship with compensation and determine their predictive ability. The questions being answered in this study are "What is the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance?", and "What is the relationship between executive compensation and board power?" Cash compensation and total compensation are measured against performance variables using multivariate regression. Data were gathered from publicly available sources such as Yahoo finance, company SEC filings, and Quandl. The study finds that revenue is the strongest variable at explaining the variation in cash compensation and total compensation. It concludes that ROA should be more aligned with executive compensation and perhaps revenue less so and that more research is needed to determine why the independent variables studied (ROA, APYt-2 & APYt-3) are not significant and to find other variables that will improve the model and help explain executive compensation.