The thesis of this dissertation is that Habermas' universal pragmatic and the recent neo-pragmatist semantic realism of Brandom, aimed at bridging the divide, are both based on misinterpretations of Hegel. Both approaches misunderstand the central Hegelian idea of historicity, and thus fail to establish a correct connection to Hegel. The aim of the dissertation is to point to and sketch Hegel's idea of historicity. As part of the discussion, I will defend the controversial thesis that Hegel did not have a system, but rather a historical account of how we develop knowledge under the historical conditions of society. Hegel, unlike Brandom or Habermas, thinks that philosophy does not seek knowledge of reality, where 'reality' is understood as the mind-independent world. Reality as such is unknown and unknowable, since it is limited through human experience of social and historical reality.