I argue that three types of goods for a person---the goodness of her life, her well-being at a time, and the objects that are desirable for her---do not stand in the straightforward, intuitive relations philosophers have commonly assumed. I begin by developing an account of what I call value contribution principles. A value contribution principle says roughly that an increase in some property, all else equal, implies an increase in some value. Value contribution principles express relatively weak but nonetheless important evaluative claims. With near unanimity, philosophers have assumed, in essence, that a value contribution principle holds between a person's well-being at a time and the goodness of her life, i.e., that an increase in her well-being during some period, all else equal, yields a better life for her on the whole. I argue that this is incorrect. Similarly, I argue that it is not the case that greater realization of what is desirable for a person, all else equal, increases her well-being. The result is that our notion of what is good for a person is less united and more equivocal than commonly recognized.