![The Origins of Secessionist Conflict: Predicting When Governments Will and Will Not Permit Secession için kapak resmi The Origins of Secessionist Conflict: Predicting When Governments Will and Will Not Permit Secession için kapak resmi](/client/assets/d79c3e4af2b6d196/ctx/images/no_image.png)
The Origins of Secessionist Conflict: Predicting When Governments Will and Will Not Permit Secession
Başlık:
The Origins of Secessionist Conflict: Predicting When Governments Will and Will Not Permit Secession
Yazar:
Levinson, Micah Nathaniel, author.
ISBN:
9780438033139
Yazar Ek Girişi:
Fiziksel Tanımlama:
1 electronic resource (145 pages)
Genel Not:
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-10(E), Section: A.
Advisors: Gary Marks Committee members: Liesbet Hooghe; Michele Hoyman; Andrew Reynolds; John Stephens.
Özet:
A question understudied in the literature on separatist conflict is why some governments permit secession to occur peacefully while others resist it militarily. To fill that gap, this dissertation presents a model that explains why dictatorships virtually always resort to military force to thwart self-determination movements while democracies usually permit secession. Dictators need a tough image to deter potential revolutionaries and palace coups and fear that ignoring separatist activity, even if it poses no direct threat to their rule, signals vulnerability that may encourage political rivals to challenge them. Peaceful secession from non-democracies only occurs when dictators initiate the separation for their own benefit, thereby avoiding the appearance of regime vulnerability.
The electorates of democracies, on the other hand, are reluctant to incur the costs of suppressing secessionist movements. An exception is when there exists in the territory claimed by the secessionists an enfranchised loyalist population that has reason to fear persecution should the secessionists win independence. When loyalists' livelihood depends on continued rule by the metropolis, the magnitude of the benefit to them of thwarting secession far exceeds the diffused cost to the metropolis's population of waging an anti-secessionist counterinsurgency. Consequently, if loyalists are enfranchised, they mostly become single-issue voters when secessionists threaten their privileged status and are able to out organize the peace camp.
This dissertation uses crisp set qualitative comparative analysis of the population of secessionist movements active between 1961 and 2007 and case studies to test its hypotheses. And, except for some anomalies surrounding India's counterinsurgencies in her Northeastern states and Kashmir, the model accounts for the entire population of cases.
Notlar:
School code: 0153
Konu Başlığı:
Tüzel Kişi Ek Girişi:
Mevcut:*
Yer Numarası | Demirbaş Numarası | Shelf Location | Lokasyon / Statüsü / İade Tarihi |
---|---|---|---|
XX(678084.1) | 678084-1001 | Proquest E-Tez Koleksiyonu | Arıyor... |
On Order
Liste seç
Bunu varsayılan liste yap.
Öğeler başarıyla eklendi
Öğeler eklenirken hata oldu. Lütfen tekrar deneyiniz.
:
Select An Item
Data usage warning: You will receive one text message for each title you selected.
Standard text messaging rates apply.