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Essays in Macroeconomics
Başlık:
Essays in Macroeconomics
Yazar:
Leon Peres Camargo Shalders, Felipe, author.
ISBN:
9780438116306
Yazar Ek Girişi:
Fiziksel Tanımlama:
1 electronic resource (124 pages)
Genel Not:
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-11(E), Section: A.
Advisors: Lawrence Christiano.
Özet:
This thesis is divided into three chapters. In the first chapter I argue that the discussion about the effects of higher minimum wages on the number of minimum wage paying jobs misses important considerations about who gets these jobs. I study a model where workers have private information about their productivity and outside options; firms have to make firing decisions based on noisy signals. When the minimum wage is increased, more skilled workers apply for jobs at firms paying the minimum wage, thus impacting these firms' retention policies. I show that a worker of an average type is more negatively affected by increases in the minimum wage. This happens because, in an environment with asymmetric information, those workers are unable to differentiate themselves from bad workers. Using a calibrated model to replicate the 2007--2009 minimum wage increase in the U.S., I find that increasing the minimum wage has no strong effect on the aggregate layoff rate of minimum wage workers. However, when focusing on those who were working at minimum wage jobs before the increase, I find that the monthly probability of getting fired increases by a factor of 7.3%. These results raise warnings as to the effectiveness of minimum wage policies as a device for wealth redistribution.
In the second chapter, I show that a binding minimum wage can provide a surplus increase in an environment where workers have private information about their productivities. Asymmetric information makes firms set a wage that is too low or too high if compared to the first-best. When firms wish to set a relatively low wage, a ``moderately binding'' minimum wage will generate a better allocation of workers in sectors of the economy; a very high minimum wage, however, will reduce efficiency.
The third chapter, co authored with Raphael Galvao, studies a model of currency attacks in which the government can choose a credible signal about the fundamentals of the economy. The government initially pegs the exchange rate and speculators decide whether to attack the currency or not. Speculators observe, in addition to the public signal, a private noisy signal. Public signals create partial common knowledge that can lead to multiple equilibria. It is possible to find disclosure policies that dominate an uninformative public signal, regardless of the equilibrium strategy played by speculators. Commitment is key to this result. The optimal policy with commitment is characterized when, if there is multiplicity, the government only cares about its lowest equilibrium payoff. In this case, the public signal is informative and leads to a unique equilibrium, which is preferred to a full disclosure policy. Our results indicate that the government has incentives for being vague in its communication. The highest equilibrium payoff for the government can be achieved with a two-signal policy. In equilibrium, agents follow the public signal and take the same action: either there is a coordinated attack, or all speculators refrain from attacking.
Notlar:
School code: 0163
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Yer Numarası | Demirbaş Numarası | Shelf Location | Lokasyon / Statüsü / İade Tarihi |
---|---|---|---|
XX(692454.1) | 692454-1001 | Proquest E-Tez Koleksiyonu | Arıyor... |
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