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Essays on Social Economics
Başlık:
Essays on Social Economics
Yazar:
Tenev, Nicholas Hingston, author.
ISBN:
9780438082649
Yazar Ek Girişi:
Fiziksel Tanımlama:
1 electronic resource (133 pages)
Genel Not:
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-11(E), Section: A.
Advisors: Steven Durlauf Committee members: Chao Fu; Rasmus Lentz; Christopher Taber.
Özet:
This dissertation comprises three papers on social economics. Each studies a different setting in which the influence of individuals' peers on their behavior shapes aggregate outcomes.
The first chapter estimates the extent to which differences in jobs found through friends can account for the aggregate wage gap between black workers and others in the US. Data from the NLSY79 are used to estimate a job search model in which individual productivity is distinguished from social capital by comparing the wages and frequency of jobs found directly with those of jobs found through friends. Jobs found through friends tend to pay more, but this premium is lower for black workers.
The second chapter, joint with Alexander Clark, develops a model in which costly voting in a large two-party election is a sequentially rational choice of strategic, self-interested players who can reward fellow voters by forming stronger ties in a network formation coordination game. The predictions match a variety of stylized facts, including explaining why an individual's voting behavior may depend on what she knows about her friends' actions. Players have imperfect information about others' voting behavior, and we find that some degree of privacy may actually be necessary for voting in equilibrium, enabling hypocritical but useful social pressure. Our framework applies to any costly prosocial behavior.
The final chapter posits that the widespread usefulness of new pricing technology crucially contributed to the 2008 financial crisis, by allowing financial services workers and regulators alike to shirk in vetting its proper use. In the model, a principal attempts to induce costly effort from a group of agents with the threat of punishment. With a convex cost of punishing agents, she may be unwilling to simultaneously punish large groups of agents, leading them to shirk only when coordination is possible. In this setting, a new technology can actually cause an aggregate downturn specifically because it is widely useful: agents do not research it properly, knowing they will not all be punished even if their project fails. Furthermore, even agents who learn that they are using flawed technology may continue to do so.
Notlar:
School code: 0262
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Yer Numarası | Demirbaş Numarası | Shelf Location | Lokasyon / Statüsü / İade Tarihi |
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XX(695297.1) | 695297-1001 | Proquest E-Tez Koleksiyonu | Arıyor... |
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