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Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances
Başlık:
Fair Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances
Yazar:
Çetiner, Demet. author.
ISBN:
9783642358227
Yazar Ek Girişi:
Fiziksel Tanımlama:
XV, 168 p. 27 illus. online resource.
Seri:
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, 668
İçerik:
Introduction -- Selected Topics in Revenue Management -- A Review of Strategic Passenger Airline Alliances -- Selected Topics in Cooperative Game Theory -- Airline Alliance Revenue Management Game -- Approximate Nucleolus-Based Revenue Shares for Airline Alliances -- Selfish Revenue Sharing Mechanisms for Airline Alliances -- A Revenue Sharing Mechanism Based on the Transfer of Dual Prices -- Conclusion and Future Research -- Appendix: Computational Study.
Özet:
A major problem arising in airline alliances is to design allocation mechanisms determining how the revenue of a product should be shared among the airlines. The nucleolus is a concept of cooperative game theory that provides solutions for allocating the cost or benefit of a cooperation. This work provides fair revenue proportions for the airline alliances based on the nucleolus, which assumes a centralized decision making system. The proposed mechanism is used as a benchmark to evaluate the fairness of the revenue sharing mechanisms, where the alliance partners behave selfishly. Additionally, a new selfish revenue allocation rule is developed that improves the performance of the existing methods.
Tüzel Kişi Ek Girişi:
Elektronik Erişim:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35822-7Mevcut:*
Yer Numarası | Demirbaş Numarası | Shelf Location | Lokasyon / Statüsü / İade Tarihi |
---|---|---|---|
HD30.23 | 140444-1001 | E-Kütüphane | Arıyor... |
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