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Essays on the CEO Incentive Compensation
Başlık:
Essays on the CEO Incentive Compensation
Yazar:
Feng, Hongrui, author.
ISBN:
9780438094611
Yazar Ek Girişi:
Fiziksel Tanımlama:
1 electronic resource (115 pages)
Genel Not:
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-11(E), Section: A.
Advisors: Ramesh Rao Committee members: Ali Nejadmalayeri; William Schwartz; Shu Yan.
Özet:
Prior empirical research documents a mixed relationship between CEO pay-for-performance compensation and firm investment policies. Given the design of currently available CEO pay-for-performance measures, it is insufficient to capture incentive-based investment implementation. Instead, I propose a new measure, managerial marginal ownership percentage, MMOP. The new measure incorporates "leverage effect" to fully capture the CEO incentive-based investment policies. Consistent with implications of prior agency-based investment models, I determine that the new measure is positively related to firm investment policies such as capital expenditure, R&D, and human capital expenditure. Furthermore, I demonstrate a positive marginal value of investment in firms with highly incentivized managers. Consistently, my results indicate that firms are providing the optimal level of incentives.
In the second essay, we develop a simple equilibrium model in which firm's desired managerial effort level plays a critical role in determining CEO incentive compensation who has increased relative effort aversion (IREA) preference. The model implies: (1) firm's desired managerial effort level is positively related to CEO incentive compensation; (2) the equilibrium effort level of CEO is a function of CEO and firm characteristics, such as the marginal elasticity of managerial effort, firm size, and managerial risk or effort aversion. Empirical tests find supportive evidence for all these implications. Measuring CEO incentives relative to stock return by Delta, we find that managerial compensation in higher managerial ability firms, growth firms, firms with greater board diligence, and high financial distress firms tend to be more sensitive to production shocks. Moreover, we also demonstrate variations in the relations between risk aversion degree and managerial effort input level across firms with different managerial incentive compensation.
Notlar:
School code: 0664
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Yer Numarası | Demirbaş Numarası | Shelf Location | Lokasyon / Statüsü / İade Tarihi |
---|---|---|---|
XX(687775.1) | 687775-1001 | Proquest E-Tez Koleksiyonu | Arıyor... |
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