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Essays on Incentives, Moral Hazard and Optimal Policy
Başlık:
Essays on Incentives, Moral Hazard and Optimal Policy
Yazar:
Schlockermann, Jakob, author.
ISBN:
9780438048850
Yazar Ek Girişi:
Fiziksel Tanımlama:
1 electronic resource (157 pages)
Genel Not:
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-10(E), Section: A.
Advisors: Alexandre Mas Committee members: Janet Curry; David Silver.
Özet:
This collection of essays studies incentives and public policy in health care and labor markets. Chapter 1 investigates the causal effect of financial incentives on hospital discharge decisions. Making use of a kink in the German reimbursement system for hospitals, I employ a bunching design to tightly bound the effect of marginal pay on patients' length of stay around zero. I discuss how the contrast between my result and the previous evidence is explained by differences in the institutional setting. In Chapter 2, I provide new evidence which improves our understanding of provider as well as patient behavior in response to incentives in health care. In particular, I show that a well-known piece of evidence in favor of moral hazard on the patient side with respect to health insurance coverage is better interpreted as limited attention behavior by doctors. Chapter 3 turns towards labor markets. It studies the impacts of heterogeneity in earnings potential on the optimal design of unemployment insurance and estimates the newly relevant parameters empirically.
Notlar:
School code: 0181
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Yer Numarası | Demirbaş Numarası | Shelf Location | Lokasyon / Statüsü / İade Tarihi |
---|---|---|---|
XX(681868.1) | 681868-1001 | Proquest E-Tez Koleksiyonu | Arıyor... |
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